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Charitable Immunity From Tort Liability in
Ohio: Present Status and Future Prospects
THEDOCTRINE OF charitable immunity from tort liability was
first announced in the English case of Duncan v. Findlater.'
Following the lead of this early decision, Massachusetts was the first
American jurisdiction to adopt the doctrine in McDonald v. Massa-
chusetts Gen. Hosp.2 From these initial decisions the doctrine
grew in favor, expanded into other American jurisdictions, and wid-
ened in scope. The subject of widespread criticism almost since its
inception, it is only within recent years that the concept of charitable
immunity from tort liability has been reexamined. As a result, im-
munity has slowly begun to contract in application and diminish in
scope. The current state of the immunity law varies from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction without any consistent pattern.8
The purposes of this Note are: (1) to explore the Ohio position
regarding charitable immunity from tort liability through a discus-
sion of the bases for the doctrine, a survey of the Ohio history, and
a look at the positions of other jurisdictions on the question; and
(2) to demonstrate the concept's inherent weaknesses and inconsis-
tencies which necessitate its abrogation.
I. THE BASES OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY
The concept of charitable immunity has been rationalized upon
at least four bases. First, the vague and all-inclusive argument of
public policy has been a major pillar upon which the doctrine has
rested.4  A second basis is the oldest approach taken, that of the
16 Clark & F. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839). The dictum in this case was followed
in Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
The doctrine was upheld as late as 1861, at which time it was restated in Holliday v.
Parish of St. Leonard's, 11 C.B.N.S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
2 120 Mass. 432 (1876). The court, in following the earlier English decisions,
failed to realize that they had been repudiated by Mersey Docks & Harbour Bd. Trustees
v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866) and Foreman v. Mayor, L.R. 6
Q.B. 214 (1871).
3 See PROSSER, TORTS § 127 (3d ed. 1964) for both a general discussion of the evo-
lution of the law in this area and a collection of cases. The cases and points of view
are too numerous to be included in this Note, but a discussion of the several positions is
discussed in notes 57-62 infra.
4 See, e.g., Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hosp., 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E.2d
287 (1922).
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protection of trust funds.5 It is reasoned that the charitable institu-
tion involved as the defendant in a tort action would no longer be
able to serve the purpose for which it was established were its trust
funds susceptible to depletion through the payment of tort judg-
ments.' A third support for the immunity doctrine is offered by
the theory that the beneficiary of a charity's services assumes the
risk of harm and impliedly waives, by the mere acceptance of such
services,7 whatever rights of recovery for negligence he might have.
It is argued that the charity serves the public in general and that it
would not be equitable to award a judgment to any particular bene-
ficiary.' Finally, recovery for torts committed by charities or their
employees has been denied because the profit motive, generally pres-
ent whenever a master employs servants, is held to be absent in the
case of a charitable-institution employer concerned only with render-
ing service to the public.' The most widely applicable theory of
immunity in Ohio has been that of public policy."0 This justi-
fication for immunity combines the elements of all the other bases"
and can be independently interjected whenever none of the other
rationales are applicable."2
II. HISTORY OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY IN OHIO
A. Total Immunity
The first Ohio case raising the issue of charitable immunity was
Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Ass'n,"3 a negligence action in which the
plaintiff contended that a nurse's failure to count surgical sponges
5 See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876); Fisher
v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 137 W. Va. 723, 73 S.E.2d 667 (1952).
6 See, e.g., Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885); McDonald v. Massachu-
setts Gen. Hosp., supra note 5.
7 See, e.g., Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hosp., 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 183 U.S. 695 (1901); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E.
537 (1924).
8 See Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hosp., 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E.2d 287
(1922).
9 See, e.g., Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98, 33 Ad. 595 (1895).
10 See cases cited at notes 23, 30, 34 & 58 infra. The public policy upon which the
maintenance of charitable immunity seems to be dependent is the preservation and ex-
pansion of charities. Charities are dependent for their continued existence upon the
gifts of donors. Since these donors would be reluctant to contribute to a charity if they
were afraid that their gifts might be depleted through tort judgments, public policy de-
mands that these funds not be subjected to possible depletion through tort claims for
damages.
11 See cases cited notes 4-10 supra.
12 See, e.g., Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
13 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
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properly as they were removed from a patient resulted in his death.
The supreme court held that whether or not the patient involved
was charged for the hospital's services, the doctrine of respondeat
superior was not applicable to a charitable institution.14  The court
pointed out that public policy demanded support of a charity's
worthy purposes and that a charity does not profit from the efforts
of its servants because its work is for the public benefit."5 Because
of this difference, the liability of the servant could not be imputed
to the charitable institution."0
B. The First Exception
After an eleven-year period of total charitable immunity, the
case of Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hosp." again pre-
sented the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court. Once again a plaintiff
had been injured by the negligent servant of a charitable institution.
In reaching its decision, the court enunciated the first of two gen-
eral exceptions which Ohio has since recognized regarding charita-
ble immunity.'" The court found that the defendant hospital had
been negligent in the selection and retention of the servant and,
although public policy favored charitable immunity, a stronger pub-
lic policy demanded that the plaintiff recover in such a case.'"
C. The Second Exception
Within another eight years, the court announced and established
the second and only other general exception to the immunity doc-
trine in Ohio. In Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius,0 the plaintiff, a
passenger in a hospital elevator, was injured as the result of an
employee's negligence. Although the plaintiff was not a patient,
the court held that while public policy would uphold the charity's
immunity as to beneficiaries of its services, the institution would
not be immune from liability to an innocent third person who was
a non-beneficiary.2 ' Furthermore, the court held that public policy
demanded a: high standard of care with respect to beneficiaries of a
14d. at 103, 96 N.E. at 1092.
15 Ibid.
'16Ibid.
17 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922).
18 1d. at 73, 135 N.E.2d at 291.
'9 Ibid.
20 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
211d. at 58, 173 N.E.2d at 739.
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charity because if non-beneficiaries were to be denied protection
from negligence, the care given to beneficiaries of the charitable
services would tend to be of a lesser quality - a result to be avoided
in view of the immunity from liability to them.22 Thus, charitable
institutions are held to the same standard of care toward third
parties lawfully upon their premises that is imposed upon any pri-
vate person or organization under similar circumstances.
D. Pre-1956 Trend
Following these initial Ohio decisions, the immunity doctrine
was extended to other areas of tort law as rapidly as the term
"charitable institution" could be defined.2" A reading of the cases
involving the full range of charitable institutions suggests that their
common characteristic is the absence of the profit motive.24 In
these non-hospital charitable endeavors as in the hospital cases, the
Ohio courts consistently held that the institution was immune from
liability for its torts unless the injured person was not a beneficiary
or the institution had failed to exercise due care in the selection or
retention of a negligent employee.25 Prior to 1956, therefore, char-
ides in Ohio were virtually immune from all tort liability.
E. Impact of Avellone v. St. John's Hosp.
An Ohio Supreme Court decision in 1956 led some observers
to believe that Ohio had abrogated the charitable immunity doctrine.
In Avellone v. St. John's Hosp.,2" the court held that a charitable
hospital was liable for the torts of its employees under the doctrine
of respondeat superior. The plaintiff in that case was a patient in
the defendant hospital and had twice been negligently permitted to
fall from a hospital bed, suffering separate injuries on both oc-
casions. The issue of immunity (and thus the existence of a
cause of action) was determined by a consideration of several factors,
among which were the changed nature of hospital organizations,
the availability of liability and low cost hospitalization insurance,
2 2 Ibid.
2 3 See, e.g., Newman v. Cleveland Museum of Natural History, 143 Ohio St. 369,
55 N.E.2d 575 (1944); Gullen v. Schmidt, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146 (1942);
Waddell v. YWCA, 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140 (1938); Lakeside Hosp. v. Kovar,
131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N.E.2d 857 (1936); Rudy v. Lakeside Hosp., 115 Ohio St. 539,
155 N.E. 126 (1926).
24 See cases cited note 19 supra and notes 30 and 34 infra.
25 See cases cited note 23 supra.
26 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
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and public policy. It was found that public policy had changed in
the half-century since the announcement of the immunity doctrine.28
Judge Putnam's dissent contended, however, that the public policy
underlying the doctrine had not changed, that the decision might
be applied to the whole range of charitable institutions, and that
the legislature rather than the courts should be the voice of change
in this area.29
In general, the Avellone decision has been followed in subse-
quent Ohio cases involving charity-owned hospitals3 0  Moreover,
hospitals operated by municipalities are liable for their torts on the
ground that operating a hospital is a proprietary rather than a gov-
ernmental function.3 The hospital liability door, however, has
not been completely opened, inasmuch as the courts have held that
although they are willing to allow recovery against the institutions,
the negligence must be both pleaded and proved."2 To date, how-
ever, the fear expressed in the Avellone dissent - that once the
doctrine of charitable immunity had been partially overcome there
could be no logical basis for refusing to carry over its rejection into
other charitable areas - has not been realized. While it is true
that the decision has been followed in subsequent hospital cases,33
immunity is still the rule found in other charitable areas. 4
F. Limitations Upon Avellone
The first major test of the immunity doctrine's applicability to a
27 Id. at 473-77, 135 N.E.2d at 414-16.
28Ibid.
29 Id. at 480-82, 135 N..2d at 418-19 (dissenting opinion).
30 See, e.g., Jones v Hawkes Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 503, 196 N.E.2d 592 (1964);
Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765 (1960); Andrews
v. Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 147 N.E.2d 645 (Ohio Ct App. 1956).
31 See, e.g., Hyde v. City of Lakewood, 175 N.E.2d 323 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962);
Koubeck v. Fairview Park Hosp., 172 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
3 2 See, e.g., Rush v. Akron Gen. Hosp., 171 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
A potential plaintiff might also take care in the selection of a hospital. See Wolf
v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 158 N.E.2d 909 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958), aW 'd, 170 Ohio St.
49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959), wherein it was held that the Ohio State University could
not be sued for negligence. See also Wierzbicki v. Carmichael, 118 Ohio App. 239,
187 N.E.2d 184 (1963), holding that the trustees of a county hospital are neither jointly
nor severally liable for negligence in the absence of malice or corruption.
33 See cases at note 30 supra.
34 See, e.g., Sturdevant v. Youngstown Dist. Girl Scout Council, Inc., 118 Ohio
App. 489, 195 N.E.2d 914 (1962); Bell v. Salvation Army, 172 Ohio St. 326, 175
N.E.2d 738 (1961); Matthews v. Wittenberg College, 113 Ohio App. 387, 178 N.E.2d
526 (1960); Rosen v. Concordia Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 111 Ohio App.
54, 167 N.E.2d 671 (1961); Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563
(1960); Hunsche v. Alter, 145 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
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charity other than a hospital arose in the 1960 decision of Gibbon
v. YWCA."6  In that case, the plaintiff was the father of a de-
cedent who had died in a swimming pool where entry was restricted
to those who paid an admission and where the defendant supplied
a lifeguard whose negligence was alleged to have been the proximate
cause of death. Supporters of the non-liability position should have
had reason to believe that the Avellone decision would be extended
to other charitable enterprises, 6 despite the decision in Tomasello
v. Hoban,"7 wherein the court had held that Avellone applied only
to hospitals. The court explained, however, that it had granted
certification because of the conflicting appellate decisions in Toma-
sello and Gibbon."8
Following a lengthy discussion of the law in which prior Ohio
cases as well as decisions from other jurisdictions were included, the
court held that it could not find the same compelling reasons to im-
pose liability in Gibbon as had been present in Avellone."9 While
concurring in the judgment, Judge Bell indicated that he did so
solely on the ground that the petition had failed to state a cause of
action.4" In the final paragraph of his concurring opinion, he
wrote:
When a foundation is removed, a structure which had been erected
thereon ordinarily collapses. I can come to no conclusion other
than that of Judge Putnam who, in dissenting in the Avellone case,
said that the rule of the Avellone case "cannot logically be circum-
scribed to be applicable to hospitals alone."41
Even though the Gibbon court was unanimous in its decision,
three judges concurred only because of the insufficiency of the peti-
tion to state a cause of action.' Therefore, hope was not yet lost
that Avellone would be extended. Nonetheless, three subsequent
cases have practically closed the issue of charitable immunity in
Ohio with reference to other than a hospital setting.43 Although
35170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
36 165 Ohio St. at 478, 135 N.E.2d at 417 (dissenting opinion).
37 155 N.E.2d 82 (Ohio C-P. 1958), aff'd without opinion, No. 708449, Ct. App.
Cuyahoga County (1959).
38 170 Ohio St. at 282-83, 164 N.E.2d at 565-66.
39 Id. at 293-94, 164 N.E.2d at 572.
40 Id. at 295, 164 N.E.2d at 573.
411d. at 296, 164 N.E.2d at 574.
421d. at 295, 164 N.E.2d at 573.
43 See Bell v. Salvation Army, 172 Ohio St. 326, 175 N.E.2d 738 (1961); Sturde-
vant v. Youngstown Dist. Girl Scout Council, Inc., 195 N.E.2d 914 (Ohio Ct. App.
1962); Matthews v. Wittenberg College, 113 Ohio App. 387, 178 N.E.2d 526 (1960).
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the courts have been consistent in establishing liability in the hos-
pital area," and have even extended it to torts arising out of medical
as well as administrative functions,45 the Ohio courts have been
equally consistent in their refusal to extend Avellone.46 Curiously,
in a case involving a municipal enterprise other than a hospital, the
supreme court found liability because the operation of a city swim-
ming pool is a proprietary rather than a governmental function.'
Just as it is wise for the potential plaintiff to avoid admittance to a
state-owned hospital,48 it may be equally wise for him to swim in a
municipal pool rather than one owned by a charitable organization.
This last illustration exposes one of the inconsistencies in the law
which causes observers to question the soundness of adhering to
such a position.
G. Charitable Immunity in Other Jurisdictions
Since Ohio has reached inconsistent conclusions in the area of
charitable immunity, the Ohio position should be compared with
the case law of other jurisdictions. As noted above,49 the applica-
tion of the doctrine differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction without
a discernible pattern. Very few of the states, however, have not
been called upon to accept or reject it."  In a slight majority of
jurisdictions, the concept has either been abrogated or never ex-
isted.5 The remaining states, although holding charities to be im-
44 See, e.g., Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964); Jones v.
Hawkes Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 503, 196 N.E.2d 592 (1964); Andrews v. Youngstown
Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 147 NE.2d 645 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956); Koubeck v. Fairview
Park Hosp., 172 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
4 5 See, e.g., Kelma v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765
(1960).
48 See, e.g., Bell v. Salvation Army, 172 Ohio St. 326, 175 N.B.2d 738 (1961);
Blankenship v. Alter, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N.E.2d 922 (1960); Sturdevant v. Youngs-
town Dist. Girl Scout Council, Inc., 195 N.E.2d 914 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962); Matthews
v. Wittenberg College, 113 Ohio App. 387, 178 N.E.2d 526 (1960); Hunsche v. Alter,
145 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
47' Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E.2d 857 (1963).
48 See note 32 supra.
49 See text accompanying notes 4-12 supra.
50 Only Hawaii and South Dakota have no noted cases in the area. Montana has
only a federal court decision, Howard v. Sisters of Charity, 193 F. Supp. 191 (D. Mont.
1961), which held that there was no immunity from liability. New Mexico, in a fed-
eral court decision, Deming Ladies' Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, 276 Fed. 668 (8th Cir. 1921)
recognized immunity.
5 1 Twenty-three states have no charitable immunity: Alabama Baptist Bd. v. Carter,
226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443 (1932); Moats v. Sisters of Charity, 13 Alaska 546 (1952);
Ray v. Tuscon Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Malloy v. Fong, 37
Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Durrey v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 46 Del. 350, 83
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mune, recognize a wide variety of exceptions generally similar to
those found in Ohio.' Very few jurisdictions apply the doctrine to
all charities.5"
Several states have mixed positions." At least two states rein-
stated the immunity doctrine by statute after the courts had ruled
that charities were to be liable for their torts just as any other organ-
ization." In no state, however, has immunity been reestablished
by judicial decision once the courts have abrogated it. Finally, no
jurisdiction extends immunity to profit-making, charitable institu-
tions.D6
A.2d 753 (1931); Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344(1940); Wheat v. Latter Day Saints' Hosp., 78 Idaho 60, 297 P.2d 1041 (1956);
Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 451 (1950); Neely
v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 192 Kan. 716, 391 P.2d 155 (1964);
Mullikin v. Jewish Hasp. Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1961); Parker v. Port Huron
Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Mullinger v. Evangelischer Diakonnies-
senverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920); Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183,
141 N.W.2d 852 (1966); Welch v. Frisbie Mer. Hosp., 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761(1939); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.B.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); Rick-
bell v. Grafton Deaconness Hosp., 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946); Gable v.
Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940); Hungerford v. Portland Santi-
tarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 235 Ore. 412, 384 P.2d 1009 (1963); McLeod v. St.
Thomas Hosp., 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S.W.2d 917 (1936); Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee
Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P.2d 645 (1938); Foster v. Roman Catholic Dio-
cese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem. Hosp. Ass'n,
43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953); Kojis v. Doctors' Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367,
107 N.W.2d 131 (1961).
52 A total of nineteen states have held charities immune from tort liability, some by
judicial decision: St. Lukes Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952);
Cashman v. Meriden Hosp., 117 Conn. 585, 169 Ad. 915 (1933); Burgess v. James, 73
Ga. App. 857, 38 S.E.2d 637 (1946); Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.B.2d 81(1950); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.B. 537 (1924); Jensen v.
Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 At. 898 (1910); Perry v. House of Ref-
uge, 63 Md. 20 (1885); McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876);
Dille v. St. Luke's Hosp., 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W.2d 615 (1946); Springer v. Federation
Church, 71 Nev. 177, 283 P.2d 1071 (1955); Hoke v. Glen, 167 N.C. 594, 83 S.B. 807(1914); Knecht v. St. Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958); Lindler v. Co-
lumbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914); Baptist Mem. Hosp. v. McTighe, 303
S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Norfolk Protestant Hosp. v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151,
173 S.E. 363 (1934); Koehler v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 137 W. Va. 764, 73S.2d 673 (1952); Bishop Randall Hosp. v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385(1916); and others by statute: N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, §§ 53:A-7 to -11, (Supp.
1965); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-1-22 (1956).
The degree of immunity varies from state to state, without logical pattern, few, if
any, of the states having charitable immunity under all possible circumstances.
53 New Jersey limits recovery to ten thousand dollars. Rhode Island provides im-
munity by operation of a state statute. Illinois and Georgia allow recovery if there is
liability insurance. See cases and statutes cited notes 51-52 supra.
54 E.g., Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3240 (1966)); Louisiana (LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1959)); Mississippi (unclear, shifting position).
55 New Jersey and Rhode Island. See note 52 supra.
56 See, e.g., Blankenship v. Alter, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N.E.2d 922 (1960) (bingo
game). Bat see, e.g., Cullen v. Schmidt, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146 (1942);
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Ill. INHERENT WEAKNESSES OF THE
IMMUNITY CONCEPT
As indicated previously, 7 the Ohio courts have long recognized
two general exceptions to the immunity rule and have found lia-
bility whenever the institution has been held negligent in the selec-
tion or retention of an employee or whenever an innocent third
party who is a non-beneficiary of the charitable institution has been
injured." An analysis of these two exceptions as well as other
special exceptions which the courts have made and applied from
time to time, when compared with the bases for which the doctrine
was established and has been maintained, reveals that their applica-
tion logically destroys the bases for immunity even as to persons
not falling within the excepted categories.
As to the trust funds of the charitable organization, even if
there were the slightest possibility that they would be depleted in
this era of low-cost liability insurance - unless, of course, the trust
funds would have to be used in order to pay the liability insurance
premiums - they would be affected in a recovery by a non-benefi-
ciary of the charitable purpose no less than by a judgment awarded
to a beneficiary. Similarly, despite the status of the party who ob-
tains a judgment, the funds are depleted whether or not the charity
was neglegent in selecting or retaining any particular servant. The
defenses of assumption of the risk and implied waiver of recovery
rights as well as the non-application of the doctrine of respondeat
superior are equally enforceable against a beneficiary and a non-
beneficiary of a defendant charitable institution. Thus, it is illogical
to limit recovery to non-beneficiaries.
There remains for discussion only the final basis for the im-
munity doctrine, that of public policy. It is a combination of the
other three bases coupled with independent considerations which
have long been cited by the Ohio courts as the primary basis for
their decisions in this area." In addition, it is evident that if the
reasons for denying recovery are inconsistent or illogical as applied
Rosen v. Concordia Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 111 Ohio App. 54, 167 N.E.2d
671 (1960), in which the court held that the plaintiff, who had been injured on church
grounds at a picnic, could not recover in the absence of a showing that the grounds were
operated as a business.
5 7 See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
58 See cases cited note 23 supra. See also, e.g., Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St.
280, 164 NE.2d 563 (1960); Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135
N.E.2d 410 (1956).
59 See cases cited note 23 supra.
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to the other immunity bases, they are no less illogical and inconsis-
tent when applied to the public policy rationale.
A. The Changed Nature of the Charitable Institution
It has been written that the trend of modern American tort
law is directed toward the abrogation of immunity, even in the some-
times parallel immunity area of municipal law."0 One reason for
this movement is that the conceptual image of the charitable insti-
tution has changed with the passage of time. Modern charities in
Ohio, as in other jurisdictions, are big businesses. An Ohio hospital
patient, whether he has hospitalization insurance or not, pays for
the services rendered. He should not have to assume the risk of
negligent treatment to any greater extent than does either the per-
son who visits him while he is confined or the person who is hospi-
talized but who cannot afford to pay for his treatment. It should
make no difference whose swimming pool one chooses to frequent
or whose bingo game or card party one attends.
B. The Insurance Factor
Apart from any theoretical or conceptual reasons for the abro-
gation of charitable immunity lies an economic factor at least as
important Low-cost liability insurance is available no less reason-
ably to charitable institutions than to profit-making organizations
and private individuals. Since the cost of such insurance, even at
reasonable rates, would most probably be reflected in the price of
services performed for its beneficiaries, the charity would very likely
not be monetarily damaged. Regardless of this factor, however,
the cost is inherently small.
The availability of insurance provides an economic justification
upon which either the courts or the legislatures could put an end
to the doctrine. Even if lawmakers insist on maintaining the con-
cept, however, a statute requiring mandatory insurance coverage
would retain the form of charitable immunity while eliminating its
illogical results, thereby permitting a plaintiff to recover on a meri-
torious claim.
C. The Ohio Trend
As was mentioned earlier," although not all of the states have
60 See generally PROSSER, TORTS §§ 125-29 (3d ed. 1964).
61 See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
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abandoned the doctrine of charitable immunity, no case has been
found in which a court readopted the concept once it has been dis-
carded. In light of the decision in Avellone v. St. John's Hosp.,62
therefore, it is unlikely that Ohio will again by judicial decision
grant a hospital immunity from tort liability, although Gibbon v.
YWCA6" indicated that other charitable institutions are still entitled
to protection. The courts have rendered their opinion after a bal-
ancing of the individual's right to redress of a wrong against the
desire to protect charities which benefit the general public. It is
submitted that the charity could take inexpensive steps to protect its
resources, and once this end were accomplished, the balancing ap-
proach would no longer be valid, since the general public would
lose none of whatever benefits it could derive from the continued
operation of the charitable institution.
It has often been said of the United States Supreme Court that
its decisions follow the national election returns." In every major
case before the Ohio Supreme Court involving a plaintiff's attempt
to recover for negligence against a charitable institution, the court
has announced that its decision has been made in accordance with
compelling public policy, balancing one interest against another.
As to hospitals, the court in 1956 found that public policy had
changed.65 Many observers, including Judge Putnam, concluded
that if public opinion had changed as to charities, it had changed
toward the full range of charitable enterprises.66 Subsequent deci-
sions have denied, however, that there has been a change in public
opinion. In support of this view, courts have stated that the legisla-
ture is the proper forum for the announcement of public policy. 7
Regardless of what the student of modem tort law would hope
public policy on this important question to be, it is apparent that
the Ohio General Assembly has definite views of its own. The
Gibbon court pointed out that in the years immediately following
62 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N._.2d 410 (1956).
63 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
64 Although this is basically a political scientst's phrase, consider the rulings in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), which dealt a major
blow to new deal legislation, and NIRB v. Jones & laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1
(1937), which was decided by virtually the same Court only two years later, following
Franklin D. Roosevelt's sweeping 1936 presidential election margin.
6rAvellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 NX..2d 410 (1956). See
cases cited note 31 supra.
66 Id. at 479, 135 N.X.2d at 418.
67 See cases cited not 46 supra.
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the Avellone decision, the General Assembly took steps to darify
its conception of public policy in the area of charitable imunity.
68
Although the bill was originally passed by an overwhelming
majority in both houses of the General Assembly, it fell short by
several votes of the requisite sixty percent majority needed to over-
ride the governor's veto.69 Whether or not the statute was enacted
into law is not important to this discussion. However, the original
General Assembly vote indicates the legislative view concerning
the question of charitable immunity. If the Ohio Supreme Court
follows the election results," and if the General Assembly's vote
rather than the veto of a governor who has since been defeated in a
bid for reelection adequately represents public opinion on this mat-
ter, then the supreme court cannot very well extend Avellone and
was perhaps incorrect from a public policy standpoint in reaching
its decision in that case.
In view of the legislature's position regarding the immunity
issue, it is understandable that the courts continue to decide as they
have in this type of case. What is not understandable, however, is
the position of the General Assembly. When thinking in terms of
politics rather than law, perhaps the position of the General Assem-
bly is all too dear. Behind every elected representative stands a
wide array of pressures and pressure groups seeking to influence
his decisions. With the sole exception of the non-profit hospital,
against which liability has already been judicially established, and
proprietary municipal functions, against which the immunity bar-
riers have been lowered, if not totally removed, the remaining im-
mune institutions include, for example, such organizations as the
68 170 Ohio St. at 285-86, 164 N.E.2d at 567 quotes from the Senate Bill No. 241
as follows:
A nonprofit corporation, society, or association organized exclusively for
religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes shall not be liable by
reason of the acts of its servants or agents for loss or damage arising from in-
jury to or death of a beneficiary to whatever degree of the works or services
of such nonprofit corporation, society, or association, unless such injuries or
death are caused by the gross negligence of the agent or servant of such cor-
poration, society, or association acting within the scope of his employment.
Payment to a nonprofit corporation, society, or association for its works
or services shall not exclude a person from being in a class of a beneficiary
of such works or services.
The bill was passed in the Ohio Senate by a vote of 29 to I and in the House of Repre-
sentatives by a 93 to 32 margin. Governor Michael DiSalle vetoed the measure, and,
upon reconsideration, the Senate was 25 to 4 in favor of passage and the House vote was
64 to 22, not quite the sixty percent needed to pass a bill over the veto of the governor,
but very close indeed.
6 9 OHio CONsT. art. II, § 16.
70 Judges from all levels of courts are elected rather than appointed in Ohio.
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Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, churches,
and various veterans' groups. Several representatives and many of
their constituents maintain personal memberships in one or more of
these charitable organizations, a considerable number of which are
represented by organized lobbies. Upon proper reflection, one could
not honestly conclude that continued immunity from tort liability
for any or all of these groups is in the best interests of public policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
A review of the Ohio decisions indicates that the judicial notion
of public policy has shifted toward the abolition of charitable im-
munity from tort liability. This trend is unquestionably sound in
light of the fact that the rationales upon which immunity has rested
have been rendered ineffectual by exceptions. It is hoped that the
General Assembly will either acquiesce in the judicial movement
toward abolition or take the initiative by enacting legislation which
will eliminate a rule of law which is no longer justified.
EDWARD C. BARAN, JR.
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